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Expert Advocacy for the Marginalised: How and Why Democratic
Mediation Matters to Deepening Democracy in the Global South
Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres
Summary
The paper argues that the practice of democratic mediation is an increasingly
common, yet under-researched, component of engagements between citizens
and public authorities across the globe. While the actors who mediate (and
their tactics) are diverse and are not necessarily of the marginalised group,
they share a commitment to overcoming representational, knowledge or
ideological deficits in decision-making for the marginalised group. While the
‘speaking for’ nature of democratic mediation clearly opens up critical
legitimacy problems, the practice of democratic mediation appears to be
remarkably common, and even effective.
The paper demonstrates this by surveying at least three kinds of democratic
mediation observed across a large number of cases. First is ‘mediation as
professional advocacy’. The mediator in these cases is more an ‘interested
intermediary’ in contentious policy politics. In a context of skewed power-
relations where certain groups remain systematically marginalised, not least
through knowledge and representational deficits, a degree of advocacy is
required to get more egalitarian policy dialogue.
Second is ‘mediation as representational entrepreneurship’. This refers to
engagements between citizens and forms of public authority that stretch from
the local to the global level. In more ‘global-local’ mobilisations, mediators are
often experts, professionals, and international NGOs. In more ‘local – global’
movements, the mediators are ‘hybrid activists’ deeply rooted in the local
identities and associations. However, in either case the actor is distinguished
by the taking of initiative to include the voices of the marginalised in a domain
of power-relations which is multi-level.
Lastly, ‘mediation as citizenship development’ refers to forms of activism
typically associated with community and capacity development, and usually
involves limited advocacy by civil society organisations (CSOs). Hence there
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may be little by way of explicit mediation in local governance decision-making
in these cases, although the empowerment of communities has a demonstrable
and mostly positive impact on local governance.
Keywords: democracy; participation; citizenship; representation; mediation.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses a significant set of issues that have received too little
attention, so far, in the debates on deepening democracy in the global south,
namely the issues of `democratic mediation’. Around the developing world, the
practice of ‘democratic mediation’ is an increasingly common phenomenon in
forms of participatory engagement between citizens and public authority which
includes, but is not limited to, the state. Notably, almost all successful cases of
public participation involve some form of democratic mediation. By democratic
mediation we refer to the actors and practices that ‘mediate’ and link citizens’
claims to existing local, national or international policy debates or decision-
making processes in order to gain greater legitimacy for citizens’ demands.
The actors who mediate on behalf of citizens are often diverse, ranging from
local civil society organisations (CSOs) which mediate between citizens and
local states, to national advocacy non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
which campaign on behalf of citizens around social issues to influence public
policy, and international social movements which broker the inclusion of poor
communities in decision-making around investments by trans-national
corporations. These mediating actors often engage in diverse mediating
practices, ranging from advocacy for the inclusion of representatives of
marginalised groups to the advocacy of the interests of marginalised groups
themselves. Invariably though democratic mediation involves arguments for
more inclusive forms of representation in what are nominally participatory
processes. It often involves an agent who while ostensible for the marginalised,
is not necessarily of the marginalised – at least not in any simple sense –
opening up complex legitimacy questions.
The paper argues that the role of democratic mediation has increasing
relevance with the emergence of new and more complex spaces for citizen
action in the context of neoliberal globalisation. The emergence of new forms
of democratic mediation challenge some of the assumptions that seem to be
implicit in relation to many dominant policy drives in the global south and north:
assumptions about the likelihood that poor citizens and marginalised
communities will necessarily benefit from policies to promote decentralisation
and citizen engagement, for example, without access to sources of democratic
mediation, facilitation, capacity building and empowerment. Despite the growth
of new forms of democratic mediation, however, relatively little has been written
which tries to understand their implications for deepening democracy. This
paper begins by unpacking the concept of democratic mediation alongside
related concepts and goes on to illustrate the varying ways in which democratic
mediation (of varying types and at differing levels) can make a difference to the
efficacy of citizen action. We show how the significance of democratic media-
tion for public participation in policy change can affirm theoretical openings of
binaries like ‘participation’ and ‘representation, and ‘invited’ and ‘invented’
spaces to allow for the recognition of practices that disrupt these easy
opposites.
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2 What is democratic mediation?
While formally ‘democratic mediation’ could refer to any form of mediation that
meets some normative conception of democracy, this is not the concern in this
paper. Instead, we are interested in the concept as it relates to practices
identified in the extensive case-study work of the Citizenship Development
Research Centre (CDRC). The CDRC is a global network of over 60
researchers and practitioners working in nearly 30 countries, coordinated
through the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.
Together CDRC researchers and practitioners have produced more than 150
empirical case studies on how citizen action shapes states and societies.
These cases examine how citizens see and experience states and other
institutions that affect their lives, as well as how they engage, mobilise and
participate to make their voices heard. Notably however, citizens rarely bring
about change on their own. Their actions are often ‘mediated’ by civil society
organisations and other actors which link citizens’ demands to existing local,
national or international policy debates in order to gain greater legitimacy for
citizens’ demands.
We show how, despite some important differences, the forms of mediation
identified from CDRC case studies share a common feature of activism by a
relatively elite third party for the inclusion of the interests of marginalised
groups in formal decision-making. More specifically we argue that democratic
mediation is characterised not only by a desire to overcome representational
deficits, that is to secure the representation of marginalised groups in formal
decision-making, but also to advance the specific issues of substance at stake.
Democratic mediators are often able to assist this advocacy by providing
access to forms of knowledge and an ideological commitment to deepening
democracy that marginalised groups may not be able to access. Indeed in
respect of the latter point, we suggest that a defining feature of democratic
mediators is that they believe that there are groups that are marginalised from
formal decision-making who have legitimate interests that are being ignored,
and that those groups and their interests ought to be championed. In those
small measures then, democratic mediation is a political practice informed by
the desire to overcome a representational exclusion.
Hence, while ‘democratic mediation’ is best understood as a form of activism
for marginalised groups, it not necessarily a form of activism of marginalised
groups or practiced by marginalised groups. To the extent that this activism
advances the representational and other interests of marginalised groups it can
be said to deepen democracy, notwithstanding the representational and
accountability issues that it raises. In this regard, the democratic mediator
offers a form of democratic leadership. This clearly muddies many neat divides,
and raises important legitimacy issues. As regards the former, the practice of
democratic mediation causes us to rethink the notion that ‘public participation’
and ‘representation’ are anathema. Indeed, this paper reinforces emergent
work that frames public participation innovations in terms of moving popular
representation in more inclusive directions (Houtzager and Lavalle 2010).
Further, it asks us to rethink the simple divide between participatory spaces
09
IDS WORKING PAPER 364
framed by the state and those framed by citizens in Cornwall’s (2002) early
contrast between ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces as initiated or driven by one of
either ‘state’ or ‘society’, not least by making the meaning of society more
complicated but also by recognising the important role of democratic activists
on ‘both sides of the equation’. Indeed, Cornwall makes similar moves in later
work (Cornwall and Coelho 2007: 1) in which reference is made to a
‘participatory sphere’ which operates in ways which transcend simple state-
society binaries. In short, democratic mediation shifts the focus of enquiry from
who initiates participation to how participation occurs and the resources and
capacities required to initiate and sustain it.
As regards the issues of legitimacy, the practice of democratic mediation brings
into sharp relief the vexed questions of whose political imaginaries, interests
and agendas are truly served in these cases. While significant, such concerns
are common to all forms of representation and hence are not unique to this
type. It is also notable, that in practice some of these legitimacy questions are
muted by democratic mediators working in coalition with groups more obviously
of the marginalised and supported by forms of politics conducted by the
marginalised. While this kind of coalition politics is both likely to be more
effective and less vulnerable to legitimacy crises, it is not the same as
democratic mediation. Indeed, there are relatively few pure cases of
democratic mediation where advocacy proceeds in the name of the
marginalised without any political connection to the marginalised. Another way
of making this point is to say that, in practice, advocacy may include mediation
moments alongside other analytically different types.
Much of the recent literature on participatory governance acknowledges the
crucial role these organisations play in opening up access to public authority
for marginalised groups and breaking the monopoly of political parties. Further,
much has been written recently on the representational identities of these
mediating actors (Houtzager and Lavalle 2010; Peruzzotti 2007) and on the
pros and cons of their increasing ‘professionalisation’ (Chandhoke 2009).
Relatively little work has be done, however, on the various forms that mediation
takes outside of the Sao Paulo case of Houtzager and Lavalle, and the
implications of this for the conception of mediation. Further, little thought has
been given to the reasons for the emergence of the newest form of
representational politics. This paper looks to engage more systematically with
this set of issues, starting with the various forms of democratic mediation,
unpacking what this means for the conception of the practice, and exploring
some possible reasons for its emergence.
Our survey of CDRC case studies identifies a number of different forms of
mediation at international, national and local levels. The identification of levels
reflects the sets of case-studies in the CDRC work we examine, and is not
analytically significant for the concept of democratic mediation. Further, we do
not believe that there is any inherent relation between these levels and forms
of democratic mediation. This noted, we did identify at least three different
kinds of democratic mediation, namely: professional advocacy, representational
entrepreneurship and citizenship development.
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Mediation as professional advocacy emerges from work on national policy-
making. The mediator in these cases is more an ‘interested intermediary’ in
contentious policy politics, for example the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
and advocacy for HIV/AIDS treatment in South Africa. The mediation referred
to here is primarily about expert advocacy for policy change in partnership with
poor and marginalised groups under a civil society coalition. However, this can
be read as democratic mediation in a context of skewed power-relations where
certain groups remain systematically marginalised, not least through
knowledge and representational deficits, and therefore require a degree of
advocacy to get into a policy dialogue on roughly egalitarian terms. Once a
more inclusive dialogue is underway, the outcome is based on consent
amongst the major players. Hence one role of the democratic mediator in this
context was to create the conditions for effective policy dialogue through
facilitating inclusion with the assistance of expert networks and knowledge. In
addition, the mediator may also be involved in explicit advocacy. While the two
examples considered are from middle-income, newly democratic countries from
the south, it may be rash to assume that this form of mediation will only be
found here as there are marginalised groups in all societies.
Mediation as representational entrepreneurship refers to engagements
between citizens and forms of public authority that stretch from the local to the
global level. The nature of mediation is also affected by the origins of the
mobilisation. In more ‘global-local’ mobilisations, mediators are often experts,
professionals, and international NGOs. The negative case of this cited below is
the state of Andhra Pradesh in India. In more ‘local – global’ movements, the
mediators are ‘hybrid activists’ deeply rooted in the local identities and
associations, for example Via Campesina, an international social movement of
peasants and small farmers. However, in either case the actor is distinguished
by the taking of initiative to include the voices of the marginalised in a domain
of power-relations which is multi-level. Further, power itself is soft as much as
hard, representation and accountability relationships are more blurred, and the
institutional framing is limited. This newer and more fluid space allows much
more of a role for leadership and initiative. In the era of ‘neoliberal
globalisation’ where power moves increasingly post-national and to non-state
actors, this form of politics is likely to become even more important.
Lastly, mediation as citizenship development refers to forms of activism
typically associated with community and capacity development, and usually
involves limited advocacy by civil society organisations (CSOs). Hence there
may be little by way of explicit mediation in local governance decision-making
in these cases, although the empowerment of communities has a
demonstrable and mostly positive impact on local governance. This form of
mediation can build a strengthened sense of citizenship, an increased
knowledge of legal and institutional procedures, a greater disposition to action,
more effective social organising skills and network-building. To the extent that
these activities deliberately look to empower citizen to engage local
government in participatory terms and to deepen the capacity of citizens to
represent themselves, as social mobilisation NGOs do, one could suggest that
these CSOs are engaging in a kind of mediation as citizen development. This
can be termed indirect democratic mediation or democratic mediation by proxy.
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It seems safe to assume that we can expect to find most forms of mediation as
citizen development in poor communities of the developing and democratic
world as this is where the majority of poor people and NGO activity is to be
found.
Having identified different forms of mediation we argue, as noted above, that
their democratic credentials rest on some version of a claim to advance the
interests of marginalised groups using special access to decision-making,
knowledge and an ideological commitment not necessarily available to
marginalised groups. Moreover, we suggest that while this politics is
comparatively new, and our cases have been from the developing world, there
is no reason to assume that it is peculiar to the south. One argument for this is
linked to the rise of neoliberal globalisation across all democracies, whether
northern or southern. Where democracy ought to give real opportunities for
poor and marginalised groups to access resources and power through the
state, the advent of neoliberal globalisation is read as undermining the
democratic state by transferring some power to post-national and private
sources. Add to this the rise of personality-based media politics which has
replaced party mobilisation as the key means of electoral politics in many
contexts, and the rise of new forms of local participatory institution which
create opportunities for new kinds of representation and participation. Hence,
at the same time as promising unprecedented opportunities for access by the
poor and marginalised to public resources, the governance of those resources
has become more complex and oblique. In this context, the role of the
‘democratic activist’ who has the knowledge and networks to access the
system, and the ideological commitment to use this for the good of the poor
and marginalised, gains greater significance. For these reasons, while
democratic mediation may not be the main form that engagement between
community and public authority, it is likely to be a growing component of
democratic politic across the globe.
3 The relevance of mediation to
CDRC work
The research of the CDRC has attempted to understand how citizens mobilise
to claim rights and to deepen democracy. Broadly speaking, the CDRC
research suggests that democracy is often made real through the claims and
active struggles of citizens and their organisations, and that strategies are
needed that focus on the relationship between states and societies. Much of
the work has focused on new forms of citizen mobilisation, democratic practice
and institutions that look to enhance the access of poor and marginalised
groups to public goods. Furthermore, this politics is not a revolutionary
rejection of liberal-democratic or representative institutions so much as a range
of supplementary practices which involve marginalised groups participating in
collaborative decision-making with elected politicians and officials. Indeed, as
suggested in this paper, participatory institutions can be read as introducing
new forms of representation into democratic politics.
IDS WORKING PAPER 364
12
Nevertheless, the emergent politics of ‘popular participation’ moves from some
account of a ‘democratic deficit’ in hegemonic liberal-democratic model. This
deficit is articulated both explicitly and implicitly. Explicit forms include public
claims by activists, movements and scholars that the liberal representative
democratic model systematically excludes poor and marginalised groups (for
example ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples). Such arguments rely not
just on perception but also point to the enduring identities of those who, in
almost any society, continue to enjoy the benefits of money, power and status
in society, and those who do not (see Cohen 1988 on ‘collective unfreedom’ for
example). Implicit appeal to some notion of democratic deficit is made when
civil society organisations, social movements and activists look to new kinds of
democratic politics other than formal representative channels, including political
parties, to advance their needs and wants.
CDRC work on the politics of popular participation has inevitably led to a focus
on the global south, as it is here that much innovative practice by activists,
organisations and communities has emerged. Perhaps this is not surprising
given the greater extent of poverty in the south, and the relative newness of
democratic institutions. In addition however, the work of the CDRC has tended
towards a methodology that focuses on citizens rather than institutions, and
tries to understand democratic politics from the citizen’s point of view.
Embarking from this more ‘bottom-up’ view of democracy has yielded dividends
in that it has become very clear in case after case that for many poor
communities democracy is made real through the claims and active struggles
of citizens and their organisations, and that popular organisation and
mobilisation, often in constructive partnership with formal authority, can make a
real and substantive difference to citizens’ lives.
Already significant work has been done in the CDRC to unpack the difference
that popular participation can make to governance, and research has shown
important democratic outcomes related to: the construction of empowered
notions of citizenship; the strengthening of practices of participation; the
strengthening of responsive and accountable states and the development of
inclusive and cohesive societies; as well as tangible material benefits for poor
and marginalised groups (Gaventa and Barrett 2010). In particular, our work
has stressed the importance of non-instrumental outcomes such a
strengthened sense of citizenship and more effective citizenship practices,
greater political awareness of rights and of one’s agency.
In addition to a concern with the outcomes of popular participation, CDRC work
has tried to understand how this politics is conducted, and under what
conditions it is successful. Given that we are invariably examining forms of
engagement between some form of popular organisation or movement and
public authority, research has naturally explored both ‘sides of the equation’ as
it were, and affirmed the importance of both popularly-rooted mobilisation on
the one hand, and supportive political will on the other to make participatory
politics work (Gaventa et al. 2007). In addition, some work has been done on
understanding how these engagements can be made formal and sustainable
(Fung and Wright 2001), and thus a permanent feature of the decision-making
process, or even a new sphere of decision-making in the public realm
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(Cornwall and Schattan Coelho 2007). Thus a key insight of the work has been
speaking to the benefits of working ‘both sides of the equation’ in the
relationship between popular movements and formal authority, and has inspired
a number of advocacy related events in the United Kingdom and South Africa.
The great varieties of contexts and varying histories of state-society relations
mean that participation takes very different forms in different places. However,
an emergent insight of the CDRC work is on the critical notion of ‘mediation’ for
successful instances of public participation. Given that the focus of much
CDRC work is on ‘constructive’ and/or ‘collaborative’ relationships between
popular movements and public authority, perhaps this is not too surprising. A
moment’s reflection redeems the basic insight that the engagement between
these differing and various constituencies is not automatic but requires some
kind of ongoing facilitation. The term that emerged organically among
researchers at the CDRC workshops was ‘mediation’.
Further credence to the idea that public participation requires a particular kind
of organising force to assist in initiating, establishing and maintaining
relationships is revealed by many negative cases. It is easy to contrast the
positive cases with many examples of where popular mobilisation by poor
people for legitimate rights is met with state repression, to where elite-driven
attempts to unilaterally ‘develop’ poor communities fails due to ignorance of
local conditions, or a lack of support from local communities. Indeed, as Partha
Chatterjee (2006) notes, the attitude most common amongst government of the
developing world towards the poor as population to be instrumentally managed
rather than as rights-bearing citizens.
However, even on the formal Weberian account of bureaucracy it would be
reasonable to expect governance to err on the side of instrumentalism, and
hence the citizen-centred character of the public participation model, with its
very different sense of rights and subjectivities, will invariably demand a
significant shift in bureaucratic mind-sets alone. This is before we apply our
minds to the popular side of the equation. Further, it is obvious that this is very
unlikely to happen without systematic intervention of the facilitative kind
captured by the term ‘mediation’. Hence, this paper sets out to explore whether
this is indeed the case, and more importantly, what mediation typically involves,
as well as identifying and characterising the various forms of mediation in the
CDRC work. First though, it is useful to start with the term itself.
4 Some conceptual and theoretical
reflections
As noted above, ‘mediation’ is a term used much in CDRC work, but perhaps a
little too loosely. Nevertheless it does capture the notion that successful public
participation requires some process of facilitation by an intermediatory actor
between communities or popular organisations and public authorities. As the
paper unfolds it will become clear that the role that the intermediary plays may
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be actually closer to what we call conciliation, and usually takes the form of
advocacy. We will return to this question later, and for the sake of progress
continue to use the term ‘mediation’ in the remainder of the paper.
The term ‘mediation’ is most commonly used in the fields of conflict resolution
and the law, and is common to the fields of labour relations, environmental and
development disputes. It is an old notion, having existed since ancient Greece
and Rome, and is typically understood as an (impartial) third party assisting
two stakeholders to find mutually agreeable solutions to difficult problems
(www.mediate.com). Mediation can occur between different levels and contexts
from individual marriage through to global peace talks. Central to the notion of
mediation therefore are two moments: first, the mediator is called in to assist
with some kind of conflict, second the mediator is there to facilitate a process –
not to make substantive input (on most versions) – and therefore seen as a
neutral player, and must conduct themselves as such. The significance of these
two aspects of the concept become clearer in contrast to some family concepts
like conciliation, arbitration, litigation, facilitation and representation.
Conciliation is sometimes used as an umbrella term for all mediation and
advisory dispute resolution processes. Like ‘mediation’, ‘conciliation’ is typically
understood as a process whereby an intermediary identifies the disputed
issues and generates options to help disputants reach a mutually satisfactory
agreement. Neither mediators nor conciliators are meant to determine an
outcome and both are meant to be neutral third parties. One notable difference
between mediators and conciliators is that the latter typically possess expert
knowledge of the domain in which they conciliate, and can thus offer informed
advice and may actively encourage parties to come to an agreement. On our
reading, the ‘expert’ framing of conciliation better suits most of the CDRC
cases than mediation, as most of the research reveals how key individuals,
organisations or even states bring significant kinds of ‘expert’ knowledge to
bear in facilitating public participation processes.
Arbitration is also a process of conflict resolution, but is an opposite of
mediation in that a third party decides a conflict in favour of one of the parties
after hearing and reflecting on the arguments of both sides. Thus the parties
themselves do not make the decision. This term has practically no relevance to
the CDRC cases as most intermediaries look to establishing a more inclusive
and collaborative decision-making process rather than make the decisions
themselves. Similarly, litigation is another inappropriate term in that it refers to
cases when conflict is resolved in favour of the party with the strongest legal
argument. Further, it is often adversarial with no attempt at dialogue, mutual
understanding and agreement. While public participation broadly understood
often has adversarial moments, the notion of some kind of inclusion in
decision-making which is democratic implies significant forms of dialogue,
mutual understanding and agreement. Facilitation is common defined as any
activity which makes tasks for others easy, and is broad enough to be
consistent with the activities described so far – assisting communities
organisations and public authorities engage in collaborative and democratic
decision-making – but perhaps not precise enough to capture the specifics of
the activity undertaken.
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Advocacy is typically understood as involving an attempt by and individual or
group to influence the formal decision-making process, whether on policy, law
or practice. Superficially this concept may not appear relevant, but only if one
understands democratic mediation to mean the facilitation of new forms of
inclusion and participation in formal decision-making processes. Even then,
advocacy for the inclusion of marginalised groups in formal decision-making is
still a form of advocacy. Moreover, our work shows that, in practice, advocacy
for inclusion is just one component of democratic mediation. As suggested
above and demonstrated below, most ‘democratic mediators’ also explicitly
advocate for the substantive interests of the marginalised group too. Thus
democratic mediation is typically a form of advocacy both for the inclusion of
marginalised groups in formal decision-making processes, and for the interests
of those groups. Consequently, it is not, strictly speaking, a form of mediation
as it typically involves both the expert knowledge of conciliation and the explicit
bias to wards one party of advocacy. Indeed, ‘democratic mediation’ is probably
more accurately a form of advocacy, and specifically a form of activism.
If ‘democratic mediation’ is actually a dually-constructed form of activism, it is
also a form of representation as it involves advocacy for a specific
marginalised group whose name is invoked in their absence. Representation is
broadly understood in the political realm to describe how a minority can act in
the name of the majority in formal decision-making processes. Looking at how
civil society organisations lay claim to different types of political representation
in participatory governance spaces in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Houtzager and Lavalle
(2010) argue that ‘mediation’ has come to play an important representational
function. Indeed, they claim that the most innovative and widely deployed
notion of representation amongst civil society actors in Sao Paulo is based on
the idea of mediating relations between excluded or marginalised groups and
the state (ibid.: 29–30):
[The mediation claim] is expressly politic: mediating relations with the state
for groups without voices outside of, but not necessarily opposed to
traditional channels of electoral representation… It refers to acting in
someone’s name, but it does not refer to a substantive concept of
representation defined in terms of any particular activity or specific benefit
or outcome. Rather, the argument is focused on the importance of the
political representation of poorly represented sectors on its own terms.
Remedying inequality in access to the state is the principal publicly
articulated justification. The argument presupposes that organizations that
invoke it, one, occupy a privileged position in this unequal distribution of
access to the state and, two, have a normative commitment to use their
privileged position to help those who lack such access to acquire some
form of access to the state. There is no evidence in the argument of any
mechanisms that could strengthen the relation between representative and
represented –the organizations and their constituencies.
Thus following Houtzager and Lavalle we would frame democratic mediation as
a form of representation by a third party, often a professional or expert actor,
who advocates for marginalised groups to access state power and for the
interests of marginalised groups. Unlike Houtzager and Lavalle though, we
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would not restrict ‘mediation’ to the activities of those groups which use the
term to describe themselves. In this paper we will use the term analytically.
Thus where Houtzager and Lavale use the term emically, we use it etically. To
put it in terms of Abraham Lincoln’s definition of democracy as ‘government of
the people, by the people and for the people,’ democratic mediation would be a
form of representation by an actor not of the marginalised, nor an activity
conducted by the marginalised, but an activity conducted for the poor and
marginalised. More specifically, it is primarily a form of advocacy for the
inclusion of the interests of those marginalised from formal decision-making.
As Houtzager and Lavalle (2010: 25) note in the case of CSOs in Brazil ‘there
is no evidence in the argument of any mechanisms that could strengthen the
relation between representative and represented’, raising questions as to what
basis the representation of the marginalised is authorised and held
accountable, to use Pitkin’s (1967) two aspects of representation as a social
relationship of the principal – agent kind. However, it is important to note that
the lack of clear mechanisms of authorisation and accountability is not unique
to ‘mediational’ forms of representation as Mansbridge (2003) points out.
Indeed, she argues that most forms of the practice of representation in the
United States, and by inference across much of the world, invoke forms of
representation that do not reflect the ‘promissory model’ where representatives
are authorised by election to fulfil promises, and then held accountable to
these (ibid.: 516). Instead she identifies a range of different forms of
representation, including ‘gyroscopic’ representation where representatives act
like gyroscopes, rotating on their own axes, that is, are accountable to their
internal goals or principles, for example, a stand on a single issue like the
environment, a good character, or a set of ideological principles (ibid.: 520).
The idea is to select a representative who will act in the system the way you
want them to act because their behaviour is constant and predictable. On the
gyroscopic model, representation is not about representatives accounting to a
constituency but about a deep predictability linked to an inner set of values.
What we are calling democratic mediation would appear to share much in
common with gyroscopic representation in that it is about a third party acting in
terms of the normative goal of securing inclusion for the interests of a
marginalised group in decision-making. However, it would also differ from
gyroscopic representation of the formal kind in that democratic mediators are
not necessarily authorised by the marginalised group to act on their behalf,
although in practice some may be authorised explicitly through membership
(see the case of the TAC below) or implicitly through partnership (see the case
of the MNRU below). Rather the justification is ideological and strategic, and
linked to the notion of a representational deficit. Thus many democratic
mediators will justify their actions in terms of the steps necessary to overcome
the exclusions of the system. Houtzager and Lavalle (2010: 21) again:
the mediation role played by the organization provides access to public
decision-making institutions (locus) that otherwise would remain
inaccessible. The argument suggests that (1) the actor is playing a de facto
representative role in its relations with public authority and, probably
because this role is not derived from a vote or other authorization by its
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public, (2) the actors mediating capacity is used in a legitimate manner – to
make claims in the interest of its public, rather than in the narrow
organizational interests of the actor itself.
The potential self-authorisation of democratic mediators is thus a feature that
creates the potential for ongoing tension and politics around the entitlement to
represent. Indeed, given the asymmetries of power in the deficit model of
democratic mediation it seems reasonable to expect that tensions around the
legitimacy of mediation will endure. By way of caveat though, it is important to
note that Houtzager and Lavalle consider just one case of mediation, and it
would be mistaken to generalise from this to all cases. Indeed, as noted in
many of the cases below, the practice of citizen mobilisation rarely takes a form
that is purely one of ‘democratic mediation’. Rather democratic mediation is
more commonly found in forms of alliance or coalition politics that involve
expert or professional actors working with or alongside more popular
organisations of the marginalised and also drawing on political practices by the
marginalised. The model in practice is usually more one of advocacy
partnership than a more hierarchical ‘advocate-client’ relationship.
One consequence of this analysis is that the oft assumed opposition between
representational and participatory forms of democracy is weakened. It is now
widely acknowledged that do participatory institutions exist alongside
representative institutions, and indeed are embedded in representative
democratic institutions in a way which is understood as ‘deepening democracy’.
The reflections on democratic mediation shed some light on what is meant by
deepening democracy here, namely that participatory processes are ways of
including otherwise marginalised voices in the decision-making process.
Further, such inclusion proceeds not so much through the participation by all
affected, as this almost never occurs, but by the active facilitation of
marginalised groups by democratic mediators. In short then, and somewhat
paradoxically, democratic mediation typically enables more inclusive forms of
representation through participatory processes.
In addition to opening up the representation/participation binary, democratic
mediation also requires we call into question the simple binary between
‘invented’ spaces created by the state and ‘invited’ spaces created by civil
society. Part of the reason for this is that while it is less controversial to identify
the formal spaces participation created by the state, it is somewhat problematic
to lump together the huge variety of ways that citizens, community-based
organisations, NGOs and social movements mobilise and organise for rights
into one category. It may even be the case that ‘invented’ spaces are
something of a residual category that only make sense in contrast to ‘invited
spaces’. Further, and as noted by Cornwall and Coelho (2007) even if a space
begins as a formal ‘invited space’ of the state, over time engagement by
citizens may transform the space into something it was not originally intended
to be originally. Is it then an invented or invited space? A similar line of thought
is pushed by the recognition that participatory spaces often involve alliances of
actors across the state-society divide advocating for greater inclusion for
marginalised groups. In ‘working both sides of the equation’, democratic
mediators transcend simple state-society boundaries, and challenge us to think
about inclusion in non-structuralist or proceduralist ways.
IDS WORKING PAPER 364
18
In what follows we identify different forms of mediation. We show how despite
substantial differences they share something of a common commitment to the
representation of the interests of marginalised groups in decision-making.
Indeed, the cases shed great light on the increasingly complex and remote
character of decision-making in a neoliberal, globalising world, buttressing the
claim that democratic mediation is an often much-needed form of activism to
overcome substantial representational, knowledge and ideological deficits. In
short, our ‘mediators’ are often expert or more accurately informed advocates
for participatory decision-making between marginalised communities and public
authority.
5 Emergent types of mediation in
select CDRC studies
This section looks to survey the various different kinds of ‘mediation’ found in
key CDRC texts. At the outset it is important to note that, despite their
impressive global spread, the 150 CDRC cases covered in the entire study
were not intended to be a representative sample of forms of citizen
mobilisation, organisation and state-society engagement in any particular way.
The sample tends to be biased towards the south, and towards the particular
interests of project members. Further, the sub-sample surveyed in this paper
was identified on the basis of convenience drawing on three major book
projects that emerged from the CDRC. Given that the paper is more concerned
with identifying and elaborating a hitherto under-appreciated element of public
participation processes than making claims about its spread, this is not a
constraint. This noted, the substantial empirical evidence of democratic in
almost all the cases we surveyed confirms what reason suggests: that is it a
practice important to successful cases of public participant across the globe.
In what follows we identify three versions of democratic mediation: mediation
as professional advocacy, mediation as representational entrepreneurship, and
mediation as citizenship development. Having suggested above that ‘mediation’
in CDRC cases is best understood as expert advocacy for participatory
decision-making between for poor and marginalised communities and public
authority, the following sets of question are used as the methodological frame
to organise the analysis, namely:
 Who is the ‘mediator?
 Between whom precisely do they mediate?
 What are the objectives of mediation?
 What are the strategies of mediation?
 What is the character of mediation?
 What are the characteristic democratic outcomes?
The following table provides a comparative overview of the three kinds, placed
on a continuum of most advocational on the left to the most facilitative on the
right.
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Table 5.1 Summary table of forms of democratic mediation surveyed
Professional advocacy Representational Citizen development
in policy change entrepreneurship
Who is Professional(s) in a Highly skilled actors. These were mostly
the CSO-led partnership In ‘global-local’ Non-Governmental
media- mostly based in civil mobilisations, mediators Organisations (NGOS),
tor? society. May even be in were often experts/ but also some
state. Partnership professionals. Community-Based
involves highly In more ‘local – global’ Organisations (CBOs)
developed mobilising movements, the too.
structures which link mediators were ‘hybrid
national reformers to activists’ still rooted in
local groups, the media the local.
and expertise.
Between Political elites in the Political authority and The community and,
whom do state, and poor and economic players versus indirectly often, the local
they marginalised groups on citizens. state. Sometimes the
mediate? the other, represented community is
through CBOs and social represented through




Object- First, mediators play a Various: effective rights To build citizens’
ives of supporting role as part claiming; an empowered capacities to act in order
media- of a coalition which sense of citizenship; to transform social
tion advances the needs/ better information and problems into public
interests of a margin- knowledge relevant to issues, and campaign
alised group. Second, in policy questions around those issues to
some cases the mediator influence public policies.
plays a leading role in
substantive policy
engagements, albeit with
the backing of partners.
Strategy Inclusion and advocacy Various: agenda-setting Educate and capacitate
of through intelligent politics involving multi- local communities to
media- mobilisation: an level representation and develop themselves as
tion advocacy politics linking the innovative use of both economic and
expert knowledge to post-national knowledge political actors, including
popular mobilisation in to reinforce the through engaging more
ways appropriate to legitimacy of popular effectively with the local
context and thus requires interests state.
a subtle variety of tactics.
Character Expert advocacy for Leadership and initiative, Much of the time there is
of policy change in especially in knowledge little by way of an explicit
media- partnership with poor and terms in a context of advocacy role play by
tion marginalised groups multi-level and often soft CSOs, with the emphasis
under a CSO coalition. power-relations. being on community
development.
Demo- Advocacy: Representational: Facilitation:
cratic Multiple outcomes, but Mostly about creating Empowering citizenship
character most clearly strength- opportunities for the by developing the
ening practices of part- inclusion of marginalised capacities of local
icipation through securing groups in a policy communities to support
inclusion for poor and dialogue, and empower- themselves. Can also
marginalised groups in a ing those groups to strengthening citizens’
policy dialogue. engage creatively. participation practices
where they exist.
advocacy facilitation
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5.1 Mediation as professional advocacy in national policy change
If we analyse the case-studies from Citizen Action and National Policy Reform:
Making Change Happen, edited by John Gaventa and Rosemary McGee. Zed
Books, London and New York, 2010, the picture emerges of mediation as
professionalised advocacy, usually by and organisation or individual in a CSO.
Across the case-studies a picture emerges of the mediator as the professional
individual or organisations in a CSO-led coalition or partnership, mostly, but not
exclusively, based in civil society. The coalition involves complex and highly
developed mobilising structures which link national reformers to local and
faith-based groups, the media and repositories of expertise. Such structures
are built over time, deeply grounded in the societies where they are found, and
linked to the biographies of those who lead them. Note that professional allies
may even be in the state. Interestingly, whether from national or local levels,
these significant movements for change were always led by actors deeply
rooted in their own societies, suggesting that international actors, whether the
international NGOs or other international organisations, may support national
change strategies, but rarely will create sustainable policy reform if the
movement for reform does not have deep national roots.
Broadly speaking, mediation is conducted between those who dominate the
policymaking process one the one hand, typically political elites in the state,
and poor and marginalised groups on the other, represented through CBOs
and social movements, although alliances often span state-society identities
rather than simply reflecting them (i.e. some in the state support policy reform
for poor and marginalised, and some in civil society oppose it). The objectives
of mediation are twofold, the first of which applies to all cases, the second
more variably. First, mediators look to advance the express needs and/or
interests of a particular poor or marginalised group on a particular national
policy issue, by assisting with representation and systemic or professional
knowledge deficits. This politics reflects the enduring and even systematic
exclusion of certain groups from the policy process. Thus competition for formal
political power is also central, creating new impetus for reform and bringing key
allies into positions of influence, often in synergy with collective action from
below. Hence the main task of the mediator is to secure effective
representation for poor and marginalised groups such that they are able to
participate directly in the policy process themselves, with assistance from
professionalised individuals/NGOs where need be. This could also be termed
mediation as conciliation. However, there are also cases where the mediator
also plays a leading role in the substantive policy engagements, albeit usually
with the backing of full CSO coalition. This takes the role of the mediator into
substantive advocacy of interests and not just access.
In brief the general strategy this may be summed up as ‘inclusion and
advocacy through intelligent mobilisation’. It involves a sophisticated advocacy
politics linking expert knowledge to popular mobilisation in ways appropriate to
context and thus requires a subtle variety of tactics. Successful policy change
occurs not through professional advocacy alone, nor just ‘unfocused’ popular
protest. What is required is (i) better representation principally through popular
mobilisation, but also through linking popular mobilisation to power through
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networks and knowledge of formal processes offered by mediator, and (ii) the
double legitimacy of professional knowledge related to the policy domain and
the popular legitimacy conferred by organisational base and popular
mobilisation. This combines the legitimacy of professional knowledge and
standing with the legitimacy of popular representation and mobilisation.
The mediator in these cases is more an ‘interested intermediaries’ in
contentious policy politics. Mediation spoken of here is primarily about expert
advocacy for policy change in partnership with poor and marginalised groups
under a CSO coalition. However, this can be read as mediation, or more
accurately conciliation, in a context of skewed power-relations where certain
groups remain systematically marginalised, not least through knowledge and
representational deficits, and therefore require a degree of advocacy to get into
a policy dialogue on roughly egalitarian terms. Once a more inclusive dialogue
is underway, the outcome is based on consent amongst the major players.
Hence the mediation role is one of creating the conditions for effective policy
dialogue through facilitating inclusion with the assistance of expert networks
and knowledge. After that the mediator may or may nor also be involved in
explicit advocacy.
As regards democratic outcomes, the answer is various and complex, not least
as there are a continuum of advocacy strategies. As regards (i) the
construction of empowered notions of citizenship, it does seem that most cases
deliver some benefit like a stronger subjective sense of citizenship, popular
solidarities, networks, and the ‘thickening’ of alliances. Perhaps most clearly
these case do (ii) strengthen practices of participation, more specifically in
terms of (a) assisting in securing inclusion for poor and marginalised groups in
a policy dialogue, and (b) empowering those groups to engage through
assistance with key knowledge resources. This seems the minimum and least
controversial adjudication of the ‘democratic success’ of mediation per se. In
addition, various cases can point to both (iii) the strengthening of responsive
and accountable states and the development of inclusive and cohesive
societies, and (iv) tangible material benefits for poor and marginalised groups
through the process of impacting on policy engagement proper in terms of
policy on paper and in implementation.
Example: The Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa
(Friedman 2010)
The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), formed in 1998, is remarkable hybrid
organisation which comprises a sophisticated leadership, both networked into
political and professional organisation and comfortable in these discourse and
knowledge systems, and a mass-base of members living with HIV/AIDS who
are mostly working people and the poor. The mediation role is thus played by
senior leadership who typically possess or have access to the elite networks
and professionalised and systems knowledge, in this case medical knowledge
mostly from international sources, but who also appreciate the critical
importance of an organised mass-base amongst those living with the disease,
and the social mobilisation of this base to effect change, especially given a
recalcitrant but popular ruling party (Piper, Bafo and Von Lieres 2010).
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Notably, this model of a broad coalition of social groups united around a
common political objective and working in a reasonably empowering and
democratic way is one which the leadership drew from their own experience in
the anti-apartheid struggle, and especially the United Democratic Front (UDF)
of the 1980s. It thus draws on these struggle legacies, but also extends them
through the active education of membership in medical knowledge around their
condition (which it terms treatment literacy), and enjoys some legitimacy by
association with this politics.
Further, over the 12 years of its existence, the TAC has looked to partner with
other interest groups, including particular professional and/or international
organisations to enhance campaigning on specific issues. For example, the
TAC joined with professional medical associations and, in this one case at
least, the Department of Health, in advocating for the removal of patent rights
for HIV/AIDS sufferers in South Africa. Hence, the TAC very consciously looks
to combine the legitimacy of representing a particular marginalised group
through organisation and social mobilisation with the legitimacy of intimacy with
the relevant medical knowledge and formal processes of governance at
national, but also international, levels.
Broadly speaking, advocacy occurs between those who dominate the
policymaking process one the one hand, typically political elites in the state,
and in particular the former President Thabo Mbeki, and AIDS sceptic, and his
loyal appointment, the Minister of Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, and
those South Africans living with HIV/AIDS who cannot afford private care, who
are both the vast majority and also poor and black people. In the process
however, the TAC also takes care to build alliances with sympathetic
organisation in civil society, including the churches and unions, and not to
threaten the power-base of the President, the ruling ANC party directly, but
court its leadership, especially those in organisations aligned with the ANC, the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African
Communist Party (SACP).
However, perhaps just as importantly, mediation occurs within the TAC between
those middle-class individuals who have access to medical knowledge and
state/political networks and the vast majority of working and poor membership
who do not. This socio-economic divide is further overlain by significant gender
differences (leaders are mostly men and members are mostly women), and
some racial divides too. Notably, the success of advocacy is premised on the
successful mediation of the more elite and popular worlds, both in respect of
representational and knowledge divides.
The TAC looks to advocate the specific interests and needs of people living
with HIV/Aids in South Africa, more especially as regards a commitment from
the state to provide education and treatment at little or no cost to poor people.
Notably, while the TAC generated legitimacy through fusing its demonstrable
popularity amongst those living with the disease though a significant and
mobilised mass base on the one hand, with the legitimacy of technical
expertise and efficacy of elite networks on the other, its core claim was a moral
one based on human rights to health codified in the South African constitution.
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Hence the claim to represent was not just based on its membership or
expertise, but mostly on it’s a claim to rights. The TAC thus presented itself as
representing an issue rather than just a marginalised constituency, and a moral
issue that the government ought to live up to at that.
As noted above, the TAC’s approach was a sophisticated one based on
lessons learned during the anti-apartheid struggles. To bolster the legitimacy of
its demands before a very popular government sceptical about HIV/AIDS, the
organisation looked to demonstrate popularity through organising a significant
and mobilised base and combine, build alliances with other organisations in
civil and political society, and embrace the medical and technical knowledge
around HIV/AIDS, much from international sources. Very importantly, as noted
above, the TAC was able to draw on two kinds of internationally and nationally
sanctioned knowledges. The first was scientific mainstream view on HIV/AIDS,
and especially the treatment of the disease. The second was the moral
commitment to human rights, also codified in the constitution. These resources
were at the heart of the TACs message and campaign, and were central to its
ultimate success.
The TAC also worked hard on propagating popular versions of this knowledge
through the media and in its branches. In terms of popular legitimacy the TAC
looked to avoid allegations of being anti-ANC in that key leaders came from an
anti-apartheid politics and many if not most members were also ANC members
and certainly supporters, and framing the issue as a health rights issue that
transcended party politics. The strategy of building legitimacy through building
a broad-based movement around the issue saw the TAC embrace a huge
variety and combinations of tactics down the years, depending on issues and
context. In many ways the TAC’s success had much to do with being able to
win over most in the ANC to its position on the disease, thus isolating
President Mbeki and his coterie.
In general the TAC was a broad-based coalition that looked to win hegemony
on the debate around HIV/AIDs treatment in multiple social spaces given its
marginalisation from formal policymaking processes for most if its existence.
This was a classic example of a kind of Gramscian ‘war of position’ over
cultural hegemony. Once it was able to access the formal policy making
process, it easily won the resulting ‘war of manoeuvre’. In terms of politics
within the organisation the embrace of rights-talk and the registers of UDF-style
anti-apartheid politics which included significant participation by membership in
some aspects of decision-making but especially in raising awareness about
living with HIV/AIDS, including the more technical, medical aspects, helped
transcend otherwise profound social divides.
As regards (i) the construction of empowered notions of citizenship, the TAC
did clearly empower its members through a treatment literacy programme that
explicitly linked living with HIV/AIDS to rights as citizens. Further, many
members would have directly experienced various aspects of issue-based
politics from politicising an issue through to popular mobilisation and protest. In
addition, ordinary members both directly shaped the policy agenda and were
genuinely empowered as medical citizens (ie. both knowledge and the capacity
for agency). This is not to say there were not problems, many of which remain.
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As regards (ii) the strengthening of practices of participation, a key objective of
the TAC’s politics was to open the closed and unstructured processes of
HIV/AIDS policy to include civil society, which it achieved. At the same time,
the TAC clearly (iii) assisted in the development of inclusive and cohesive
societies through effecting a policy change that will positively affect the lives of
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, or people. Further, the TAC did reinforce
certain civil society relations although how enduring those are remains to be
seen, and certainly has enhanced local solidarities, networks and subjective
sense of citizenship. Lastly, as regards (iv) tangible material benefits for poor
and marginalised groups the TAC made clear gains for people living with
HIV/AIDS not just in terms of symbolic recognition brought about by policy
change, but through its practical implementation. While there are still problem
here, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people have been touched
positively by the TAC’s work.
Example: The National Movement for Urban Reform (MNRU) in
Brazil (Avritzer 2010)
Movimento Nacional para Reformab Urbana (MNRU, National Movement for
Urban Reform) is a rare example of national civil society movement in Brazil,
and a successful one. It was able to gather popular actors (social movements,
trade unions, community-based organisations) and specialists (NGOs and allies
in political parties and government) to create an agenda for Brazilian political
society, directly influence law, and to influence the Brazilian Congress in the
long term. Down time becomes the Fórum Nacional para Reforma Urbana
(FNRU, National Forum for Urban Reform), and returns more to local level
politics. Nevertheless, it starts out mediating between popular and professional
organisations, and engages in sustained advocacy or formal lobbying of
political society.
At the broadest level the MNRU advocated for the interests of the urban poor
in the national law-making process. In terms of more practical mediation, it was
able to combine local popular organisations and national professional
associations, along with allies in national government and parties, behind a
pro-urban poor reform project.
For the MNRU the objective of the advocacy was to change national law and
policy at an opportune time in favour of the urban poor.
Notably this was not a high mobilisation case as with agrarian reforms or
budget reform movements in Brazil. Rather then MNRU used classic lobbying
tactics through its most important partners to influence the national policy and
law-making processes during (and after) the constitution-making process. Key
here was the legitimacy afforded by popular support and networks across civil
society and party lines in the initial phases, but then also personal progressive
networks in the media, parties and government. The MNRU was also able to
draw on the financial resources of professional organisations which was
important for effective lobbying. Down time lobbying comes increasingly to
dominate the MNRUs tactics after the mobilisation moments of the early
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engagements. Questions emerge about its relation to the mass base, and
inability to affect implementation given its increasingly professional and
lobbying character. Indeed, the implementation of pro-poor urban policy turns
out to be significantly influence by local urban governance, and the relations
between parties and civil society at this level too. At this level the MNRU and
its successor are less successful. The urban reform movement is instructive as
to the general non-alignment of civil society actors with political society actors
throughout Brazilian democratisation.
The NMRU is more of an NGO-led lobby coalition with mass appeal. It ends up
lobbying for national law and policy change under particular conditions of
fluidity in foundational law: the constitution-making process. It becomes an
almost pure case of the professional democratic mediator. This is not to say
that popular roots were not important though, especially at the outset. Urban
social movements arose in large numbers in the second period of demo-
cratisation from 1975–1985. They were limited to the local level however. The
MNRU emerged in 1982 with the idea of articulating a proposal for urban
reform in the national constitution-making process. The NMRU is atypical of
Brazilian civil society of the time as it was national and used professional
knowledge, networks and lobbying tactics mostly. The NMRU was thus a hybrid
between a social movement and lobby organisation from the outset: a broad
coalition of social actors but over time seems to become more and more a
professional NGO lobbying national government and less a mass-based social
movement.
In terms of (i) the construction of empowered notions of citizenship, it seems
that the NMRU’s initial process of citizen involvement in developing the inputs
to constitution-making was not sustained, and thus the impact would have been
limited. However, the substantive gains of the NMRU include a legal securing
legal recognition of everyone’s ‘right to the city’, including the right to a decent
living which seems likely to positive impact on empowered notions of
citizenship. Further, in respect of (ii) strengthening of practices of participation,
after an initial period in the campaign that was good for building national civil
society networks, including with progressive political and administrative elites,
little more has occurred. It is not clear that it has been inherently good for civil
society strengthening at the local level. Similarly, as regards (iii) the
strengthening of responsive and accountable states and the development of
inclusive and cohesive societies the campaign did (a) secure the securing legal
recognition of everyone’s ‘right to the city’, including the right to a decent living,
(b) subordinate private property to city policy and (c) enhance the democratic
governance of cities. It seems likely that these principles could assist in
securing more democratic states. Lastly, in respect of (iv) tangible material
benefits for poor and marginalised groups, the condition of the urban poor has
improved significantly across Brazil not least thanks to the national law.
However, the upliftment of the urban poor also depends on the governance in
each city, and this has much to do with the configuration of local political
leadership and its relationship with civil society too.
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5.2 Mediation as representational entrepreneurship
If we analyse the case-studies from John Gaventa and Rajesh Tandon (eds)
(2010) Globalising Citizen Engagement, London: Zed Books, the picture
emerges of mediation as representational entrepreneurship in a complex and
multi-faceted governance system by ‘hybrid’ actors.
In general mediators are highly skilled actors who may be individuals, NGOS,
social movements, or even the state itself. E.g. Tarrow describes these
individuals as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ or ‘transnational activists’. Alonso prefers
to use the term ‘hybrid citizens’, who maintain deep rootedness to the local,
even while moving within and across global arenas. Many cases refer to
NGOs, social movements and states. Typically, mediators intervene between,
on the one hand, multiple sources of power, at different geographical levels
(post-national, national and local), both hard (formal institutions) and soft
(emergent practices, dominant forms of knowledge, economic and political
incentives) engagement, public and private organisations, and the citizen
movements on the other hand.
The objectives mediation vary, but include effective rights claiming by citizens
leading to tangible material benefits, but also a sense of empowered
citizenship through enabling better representation of citizen’s interests in
respect of the various forms of power, and better information and knowledge
relevant to key policy questions. Similarly, strategies vary but include an
agenda-setting politics involving multi-site representation and the innovative
use of knowledge to reinforce the legitimacy of popular interests or
organisations. The objective of this is to ensure the inclusion of poor and
marginalised groups in the decision-making process. In terms of
representation, what marked these as distinctive was engaging across a
number of levels of power simultaneously (e.g. international, national, local),
not just aiming at one level. In terms of knowledge the attempt is to engage
seriously with emergent forms of post-national knowledge. The key point here
is that in a context of ‘soft’ power, with often loose accountabilities, the ability to
gain political legitimacy depends in turn on whose knowledge is seen as most
legitimate and how an issue is framed. Mobilisation involves not only popular
action, but also mobilisation of knowledge.
In general, then the character of democratic mediation is one of ‘policy
entrepreneurship’. Notably, the nature of mediation is also affected by the
origins of the mobilisation. In more ‘global-local’ mobilisations, mediators were
often experts, professionals, and international NGOs. In more ‘local – global’
movements, the mediators were still ‘hybrid activists’ yet more deeply rooted in
the local identities and associations. However, in either case the actor is
distinguished by the taking of initiative in a domain of power-relations which is
multi-level, power itself is soft as much as hard, presentation and accountability
are more blurred, and the institutional framing is limited. This newer and more
fluid space allows much more of a role for leadership and initiative.
The democratic outcomes of ‘charismatic entrepreneurship’ mostly focus on (ii)
strengthening practices of participation’, more specifically in terms of creating
opportunities for the inclusion of poor and marginalised groups in a policy
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dialogue, and empowering those groups to engage creatively, set knowledge
agendas, and claim legitimacy through assistance with key knowledge
resources. However, then there are a number of democratic assessments that
can be made in regards of (iii) the strengthening of responsive and accountable
states through an impact on policy engagement proper in terms of policy on
paper and, (iv) and impact on tangible material benefits through imple-
mentation, as well the effects of the engagement on (i) the construction of
empowered notions of citizenship through aspects like a subjective sense of
citizenship, popular solidarities, networks, and the ‘thickening’ of alliances.
Note that in the examples that follow, the second one on Unilever and rural
women’s development in India is an example of what happens in the absence
of appropriate forms of democratic mediation by the relevant state.
Example: Via Campesina: small farmer and globalisation (Borras and
Franco 2010)
An international social movement, Via Campesina, comprised of national and
sub-national associations of small farmers and peasants from the north and
south, formed in 1993 as a response to neoliberal globalisation. Via Campesina
is both an actor and an arena of action, hence the concept of ‘mediation’
applies to its role between the rural poor and policymakers, and within the
forum to relationships between various members. We will be examining it more
in the former sense as this relationship is more important in terms of actual
policymaking, and also characterised by the immense power disparities typical
of many instances of mediational politics.
In terns of advocacy, Via Campesina engages national governments but
especially the global economic institutions in the name of the rural peasantry
and small farmers. At the same times, Via Campesina is itself a site of
engagement between a range of organisations.
In terms of advocacy, Via Campesina looks to more properly insert the voice
and interests of the rural poor into global programmes around rural
development, particularly looking to reject neoliberal, market-based
approaches, and typically the defend the role of democratic public authority in
rural governance, and especially the democratic rights of those affected. In so
doing Via Campesina has looked to open new spaces for policy engagement
and set new agendas for rural development. In terms of internal mediation, Via
Campesina has looked to include organisations more properly representative
and rooted amongst the rural poor, and marry their various ideologies,
personalities and interests to the political demands of engaging with globalising
sources of governance on rural development.
In terms of advocacy, Via Campesina’s strategy has mostly been one of
contesting dominant policy positions and forms of governance at the global
level, and advocating for the creation of new, more democratic processes
which include the genuine representatives and voices of the global rural poor.
It uses a combination of strategies: ‘exposing and opposing’ neoliberal land
policies and the institutions that promote them (principally the World Bank) and
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using strategic ‘tactical alliances’, with friendly institutions or groups within
these institutions, for example, the United Nations). Key here is defending a
role for the state as democratic intermediatory between global corporations or
capital and local communities. It has thus embraced the language of demo-
cratic rights, holding that ‘rights holders’ (poor peasants) are entitled to hold the
‘duty bearers’ (national governments) and now increasingly international
organisations and governance processes accountable for land policies. Further,
these rights are explicitly linked to a citizenship at local, national and
international levels, with corresponding ‘duty-bearers’ at each level.
Via Campesina has also looked to contest the technical economic knowledge
propagated by the World Bank with their own knowledge of the lived-
experience of their members. Indeed, the transnational nature of the land
reform campaign has partially eroded the traditional monopoly of the World
Bank and other international institutions on access to and control over key
information related to land and peasantry in different national and international
locations. The main forms of action in the campaign include protests in
international venues, participation in some official conferences, and non-
participation in others, combined with continuing land-related actions ‘from
below’ in national and local settings. Civil society campaigns that are more
vertically integrated have become a necessity, as mobilisation of the mass
base remains the key source of power.
In terms of advocacy its character is one of ‘innovative agitation’, which is
mostly negatively framed in terms of policy, that is, critical of neoliberal
substantive positions, but more positively framed in terms on demanding the
inclusion of poor communities and their representatives in decision-making
from the local to the global levels. Implicit in this is a defence of democratic
public authority against market control. In terms of its internal ‘mediation’, Vía
Campesina is a complex mix of movements with differing degrees of
rootedness in the poor, ideologies, personality clashes and agendas. Fraternal
relations within Vía Campesina are primarily defined along the lines of agrarian
populism: ‘peasant community’ versus ‘outsiders’ and ‘them’ versus ‘us’.
Solidarity channels have been quickly forged between different classes of the
rural poor: peasants, small farmers, fisherfolk and indigenous peoples.
Tensions remain about marrying the technical knowledge and representational
networks of professional NGO-type organisations with the mass-base of a
social movement. Added to this are the tensions created by mediation between
the movement’s global leadership and sub-national movements.
In terms of (i) the construction of empowered notions of citizenship Vía
Campesina can be seen as empowering its members by affirming new forms of
political identify through a multi-layered sense of citizenship and new channels
of solidarity. Land rights have become reframed as global, national and local
citizenship rights. As regards (ii) the strengthening of practices of participation
Vía Campesina can claim the greatest achievement as its global campaign for
agrarian reform has contributed to the creation of a new ‘citizenship spaces’ in
international and national policy making processes. These are termed
‘citizenship spaces’ because when using such a venue, Vía Campesina
activists are politically conscious of their ‘rights’ as citizens, they use this arena
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to hold accountable institutions they perceive to be ‘duty bearers’. What existed
prior to this new citizenship space were institutional spaces used by NGOs and
relatively well-off farmers – often claiming they were acting on behalf of poor
peasants. Further, the emergence of Vía Campesina has not shrunk the
relative share of each key civil society actor in the global governance terrain as
the space created and occupied by various civil society groups was expanded,
and also rendered much more complex in an enriching way. In respect of both
(iii) the strengthening of responsive and accountable states and the
development of inclusive and cohesive societies and (iv) tangible material
benefits for poor and marginalised groups Via Campesina’s gains are modest.
In terms of changes to actual policies and the lived-experiences of rural
development, Vía Campesina can claim mostly negative gains, in the sense of
stopping further bad policies from being implemented, rather than championing
the introduction of new progressive policies which have yielded positive real
world results.
Example: Unilever and Rural Women’s Development in India
(Thekkudan 2010)
In this case the mediator is the Indian state government of Andhra Pradesh –
although this case is mostly of asymmetrical or failed mediation by the Indian
state. Here the mediator is intervening between on the one hand, Hindustan
Unilever Limited (HUL), the Indian division of the Unilever trans-national
corporation, and on the other hand, poor women in self-help groups (SHGs) in
rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, India. The mediation was aimed, on the one
hand, at facilitating HUL’s objective of creating income-generating capabilities
and improving the living standards of underprivileged rural women through
providing a sustainable micro-enterprise opportunity, and on the other, realising
government’s own objectives of empowering women as entrepreneurs through
the self-help group movement.
The state’s strategy has been one of assisting the corporation to achieve its
objectives without properly considering or consulting the participants in the
project, and without sustaining its role in the project. Thus in response to HUL’s
approach, the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) entered into a public-
private partnership with HUL to initiate Project Shakti in 50 villages of Nalgonda
District. A livelihood and marketing support agency, Marketing and Rural Team
(MART), in collaboration with the State Department for Rural Development’s
Andhra Pradesh Rural Livelihoods programme in Nalgonda District, proposed
the idea of retailing HUL products. After detailed discussions with HUL
representatives, details of the collaboration were worked out.
State support was further evident in the fact that the GoAP, through the District
Rural Development Agency (DRDA), was jointly involved with HUL and MART
in the selection of the Shakti Amma. In some cases, DRDA staff and the
mandal (block, the second tier of Indian local government) officials have also
been instrumental. At no time were the participants in the project properly
consulted, and neither do forums or mechanisms exist for collective
engagement and input into the governance of he project. Further, the state
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players gradually withdrew from the role of the facilitator in the second and
third years of the project as officials felt that once the project was in place, both
the Shakti Amma and HUL could manage it on their own.
Other than moments of consultation in the set-up of the project, the state
government failed to respond to the initiative from global business in a
considered and sustained way that facilitated the inclusion and empowerment
of their citizens in this project, and thus effectively missed an opportunity for
entrepreneurial democratic mediation. The lack of meaningful inclusion of
citizens has meant that the project has succeeded only in the narrowest
economic terms suitable to HUL. The social and political potentials of the
project have been lost.
Hence, although most participants have benefited financially from the project,
women entrepreneurs have stated that they were unable to meet the expected
targets since the time and efforts invested in the dealership did not justify the
profits. Only where the participant is already a shopkeeper was the profitability
of the initiative assured. The project has changed gender relations, but not
equalised them. Thus prior to this initiative, many women participants were
housewives, teachers, working in their fields or in the family shop. After the
initiative, they have started earning money of their own and now contribute to
the family expenses. The ability to do so within the confines of their homes has
increased their self-confidence and their awareness and knowledge of their
surroundings. However, the initiative was time consuming, with the women
spending between two and eight hours daily. For most, the dealership was a
collective effort of the entire household. Husbands or sons employed outside
the village or having means of transport by which they could easily access
other villages become primarily responsible for taking orders and delivery of
goods to the nearby villages. Many projects are thus being taken over by the
men, and so the Project Shakti has to a certain extent promoted this
understanding of the distinction between the private and public realms – even
though its goal may have been just the opposite.
Consequently, the Shakti Amma has become the Indian equivalent of the ‘Avon
lady’ in Western countries who moves from door-to-door selling the concept of
feminine beauty through cosmetic products; similarly, the Shakti Amma in their
bid to become ‘power mothers’ have in reality become ‘beauty agents’. There
has been no promotion of a wider sense of citizenship, not least as there are
no opportunities for participants to engage in the decision-making over the
project collectively, and the lack of a transparent and democratic governance
process once the project got underway has seen a number of civil society
organisations withdraw from the project as they felt they had not possibility of
impacting positively on practice. This project has also thus missed the potential
transformational opportunity posed by Unilever, the parent company of HUL,
attempting to transform itself by minimising the negative impacts of it business,
and become part of the solutions to crises across the globe. In India more
specifically, HUL has endeavoured to be a good ‘citizen’ through its community
social responsibility approach.
The democratic implications of a lack of entrepreneurial democratic mediation
meant that the project is successful only on the lowest bar of tangible material
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outcomes. Thus initial research showed that most women were making a living
from the project but not at the rate hoped for, and that this did help some
individuals feel more empowered and enhance their status. However, as noted
above, in the construction of empowered notions of citizenship, the
strengthening of practices of participation and the strengthening of responsive
and accountable states and the development of inclusive and cohesive
societies the project has largely failed. Gender relations, social cohesion,
organisations and citizenship are all minimally affected. In short, a huge
opportunity has been lost due to the lack of democratic mediation by the state.
5.3 Mediation as citizen development
Many theories of democracy discuss the importance of an empowered citizenry
who can actively participate in democratic life, hold the state to account and
exercise their rights and responsibilities effectively. Learning these skills
involves the development of citizens as actors, capable of claiming rights and
acting for themselves. As Gaventa and Barrett (2010: 21) argue, ‘an important
first-level impact of citizen engagement is the development of a greater sense
of rights and empowered self-identity, which serve as a prerequisite for action
and participation.’ Many CDRC case studies demonstrate that a strengthened
sense of citizenship and more effective citizen practices are critical building
blocks for achieving broader governance and social development goals. An
important part of building more effective citizenship practices is to develop
greater political knowledge, awareness of rights and agency, and developing
social organisation and networks. Gaventa and Barrett (ibid.) argue that ‘there
is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the construction of knowledgable
and empowered citizens is one of the most important sets of outcomes
produced by citizen engagement’. Building such ‘citizenship’ capacities can
facilitate other democratic and developmental outcomes.
CDRC cases have shown the importance of forms of mediation which build
citizens’ knowledges of rights and capacities for active participation. If we
analyse the case-studies from the Zed volume Mobilizing for Democracy, the
picture emerges of mediation as citizen development aimed at building citizen
capabilities in local governance. These forms of mediation aim the build the
capacity of citizens to represent themselves.
These were mostly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOS), but also some
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) too. Many of these are social
mobilisation organisations which seek to build citizens’ capacities to act in
order to transform social problems into public issues, and campaign around
those issues to influence public policies. Within specific contexts these
organisations are often highly diverse and display diverse organisational
strategies (Kabeer and Mahmud 2010). Some of these organisations play a
coordinating role, linking civil society organisations to each other, to mediate
relations with the state and to coordinate collective action (Ferreira and Roque
2010). Many of these organisations run training programmes on rights for
citizens and work behind the scenes to empower individuals and groups to act.
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Mediation occurs mostly between the community, usually poor or marginalised
people, and, indirectly often, the local state. Sometimes the community is
represented indirectly through CBOs and sometimes the mediation also
engages national or international civil society organisations.
The CSOs intentionally educate and capacitate local communities to develop
themselves as both economic and political actors, including through engaging
more effectively with the local state. The latter is often done independently of
the CSO’s programmes but sometimes through them. Sometimes the CSOs
mediate between these communities/members and national/international CSOs
too.
These are various but most centre on some explicit training of community or
members to advance their own personal and collective development, including
sometimes through engaging the local state amongst other organisations too.
The case studies show how different organisational strategies lead to different
outcomes when it comes to building citizens’ capacities and practices of
participation.
Much of the time there is little by way of an explicit advocacy role play by
CSOs, with the emphasis being on community development. Hence there is
little by way of explicit mediation in local governance decision-making in these
cases, although this granted the empowerment of communities has a
demonstrable and mostly positive impact on local governance. However, to the
extent that these activities empower citizen to engage local government in
participatory terms, and are intended to do so, one could suggest that these
CSOs are engaging in a kind of mediation as citizen development. This claim is
more obviously defensible in the many instances of direct involvement by these
development CSOs in engaging local public authority.
At first glance these studies seem to have the least obvious outcomes in terms
of (iv) tangible material benefits for poor and marginalised groups. Here the
emphasis seems primarily on (i) construction of empowered notions of
citizenship with most effort going into directly developing the various capacities
of local communities to support themselves. However, some of these cases
show how in contexts with fragile democratic institutions and unresponsive
states, these forms of mediation can result in more tangible developmental
outcomes associated with improvements in livelihoods and challenges to
political abuses of power. Mediation as citizen development can have benefits
for strengthening of citizens’ participation practices where they exist in local
government, strengthening of responsive and accountable states and the
development of inclusive and cohesive societies through enhancing social
capital, and the building of stronger alliances.
Example: NGOs in Bangladesh (Kabeer and Mahmud 2010)
In this case study the mediating role is played by high profile registered
development NGOs which are very active in the everyday lives of the country’s
poorer citizens. They operate in more than 78 per cent of rural villages. Some
are national in scope, others are more regional. All rely heavily on foreign
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donor funding. Their organisational strategies vary: some focus more narrowly
on microfinance issues, and others more on social mobilisation. All work
directly with citizens at the village level. Together they constitute an elite group
of NGOs in Bangladesh.
Broadly speaking these NGOs mediate between ordinary citizens, on the one
hand, and local leaders and the local state on the other. They work directly with
marginalised communities through local branches of their organisations. Many
of the NGOs mediate their members’ relationship with the informal justice
system of village communities and in other local decision-making committees.
They also mediate ordinary citizens’ interactions with locally elected
representatives and members of the local administration.
There is a set of common developmental objectives regardless of the overall
strategic orientation and organisational approaches of these NGOs. These
include the building of health and economic capacities and skills, strengthening
capacities for community participation, access to information, and increases in
social status for marginalised groups. However, the objectives of the mediation
can differ with the overall strategic orientation of these NGO’s. Kabeer and
Mahmud argue that those organisations associated with microfinance-oriented
approaches view their mediating roles in a more restricted way, linked to
minimalist approaches to service provision and a narrow economic
empowerment agenda. Indeed, perhaps these are not best understood as
mediators in the strict sense. Other NGOs however view the objective of
mediation in more social mobilisation terms, associated with building their
members’ capacities to participate in the life of the community, to stand up for
their rights and to fight injustice. Again while they may not take this
presentational challenge on themselves, these NGOs seem more obviously
practising a form of indirect democratic mediation or democratic mediation by
proxy.
Strategies of mediation differ according to the overall organisational
approaches of the NGOS. Both types of NGOs have group-based strategies,
meet on a weekly basis and promote savings by members. However,
microfinance NGOs provide micro credit services to its members whereas
social mobilisation NGOs are more hostile to NGO provision of credit, on the
grounds that it would reproduce old relationship of dependency in a new form.
Against this, social mobilisation NGOs stress rights-awareness training. They
encourage their members to become more active in community life and to build
capacity for self-representation.
Despite these significant differences, the character of mediation can be
described as one of another form of ‘citizenship development’, usually to
engage local governance. Some do this more explicitly than others, but there is
a general orientation.
In respect of (i) the construction of empowered notions of citizenship social
mobilisation NGOs showed greater democratic outcomes associated with the
construction of citizenship through their members’ increased political capacities
for political participation, negotiating skills, working in the legal system and
making themselves heard. As regards (ii) the strengthening of practices of
participation, social mobilisation NGOs do encourage active participation in
informal justice committees and local committees responsible for the informal
governance of the villages. Further their members also engage more in voting
and challenging social violence. To this extent they can also be seen to be
contributing to (ii) the strengthening of responsive and accountable states and
the development of inclusive and cohesive societies. Lastly, as regards (iv)
tangible material benefits for poor and marginalised groups, all clearly deliver
real outcomes, including the microfinance NGOs.
Example: The NRA in Angola (Ferreira and Roque 2010)
The key mediating actor is a federation of fifteen local associations, the
Federation of Representative Associations of Dombe Grande (NRA) in the
comuna of Dombe Grande, a small town near the provincial capital, Benguela,
Angola. The NRA is a network of local associations which organise their
members at the village or neighbourhood level. The majority of these local
associations represent small scale farmers. Some of the NRA’s local
associations are civic associations, offering civic education services to citizens
and members of the police force.
Within the NRA there are multiple levels of mediation. The network of
associations, the NRA, mediates between communities and local and municipal
government. One of its primary functions is to mediate between local
government and representatives of local associations. It also mediates between
member associations and international NGOs and development agencies. It
mediates between civic associations of different municipalities. Member
associations of the NRA themselves mediate between communities leaders of
ordinary citizens. Within the NRA itself a set of more organised associations
act as mediators between the association and newer, less organised
associations.
The NRA aims to bring together and represent the demands of its member
associations to local government and to donors. It also provides services for its
member organisations, such as training, advice on constitutions, mediation with
donors, access to technical expertise and monitoring of the associations’ credit
activity. Central here are forms of capacity building such as strengthening
connections between local associations; using formal participatory spaces,
networks around, between but not service delivery relations with the state. This
is viewed as a mistaken approach which undermines the idea of partnership.
Organisational development and membership development through capacity
building. Central to organisational development is the establishment of
networks and alliances as well as skills and knowledge.
In terms of (i) the construction of empowered notions of citizenship there is a
greater awareness of rights, self-esteem and citizenship amongst membership.
As regards (ii) the strengthening of practices of participation, there is greater
access to new formal spaces for participation, and also increases in mobilisa-
tion. In respect of (iii) the strengthening of responsive and accountable states
and the development of inclusive and cohesive societies, the NRA and affiliates
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report greater access to funding, building relations between associations and
ordinary citizens, and the economic and political empowerment of farmer
associations. Lastly, as regards (iv) the tangible material benefits for poor and
marginalised groups there are clear increases in the capacities of small
farmers to support the livelihoods of their poor members.
6 Conclusion: The character and
consequences of democratic
mediation
The above survey reveals the myriad ways in which very different kinds of
actors play an intermediary role between marginalised communities and
various forms of public authority in pursuit of democratic objectives. Indeed,
even the emergent analyses of the forms of mediation as professional
advocacy, representational entrepreneurship and citizen development conceal
important differences within the sets of cases, and there are other ways of
reading the collection of cases. Nevertheless, it is hopefully clear by now that
there is something substantive to the notion of ‘democratic mediation’ as
loosely embraced in CDRC work, and it refers to the key intermediatory role
played by ‘expert’ third parties in advocating for the inclusion of marginalised
groups, and their interests, in the decision-making processes of public
authority.
The following ten points summarise the analysis of the paper. First, mediators
are defined by the role they play rather than who they are as actors. Thus
mediators can be individuals, civil society organisations, or even states.
Second, mediators intermediate between (marginalised) communities, on the
one hand, and forms of public authority on the other, but may be from either
‘side of the equation’ or neither. Third, mediation involves some form of
representation, including in participatory spaces. Communities sometimes
participate directly and freely in engagements with public authority, but almost
invariably are represented by CBOS and NGOS and often though a
combination of both, opening up familiar problems of representation, inclusion
and accountability between communities and their leaders. Importantly,
different practices of mediation take different representational forms, throwing
up a range of legitimacy challenges.
Fourth, it is critical to note that public authority can exist from the local to the
global and indeed across several of these at a time on an issue like farming for
example. Further, public authority need not be literally always the state or
government, but any authority sanctioned by the state or government, including
‘public-private partnerships’ between government and business, or ‘public-
community partnerships’ between governments and civil society formations.
Hence the nature of public authority is more complex and less formal than
government (for an excellent discussion of this see Introduction to John
Gaventa and Rajesh Tandon (eds) 2010). Indeed, a key claim of this paper is
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that the growing complexity of governance creates a need for ‘experts’ who
have the contacts, knowledge and commitment to access decision-making
more effectively.
Fifth, mediation occurs both in the ‘invited’ and invented’ spaces of state-
society engagement. Generally-speaking public participation processes which
are driven ‘from below’ by organisations rooted in communities typically require
mediation that can interpret and relate legitimate popular concerns to the
formal systems of power, with their particular representational and knowledge
conditions. Conversely, public participation processes which are driven ‘from
above’ by well-intentioned elites typically require mediation that can connect
systems of formal power and knowledge with community needs legitimated
through democratic means such as formalised representation and widespread
participation in processes. Where the former face challenges of how to speak
to power, the latter face challenges of how to engage communities
democratically. Notably though, mediators may be from either side of the
equation or neither, calling into question the simply state-society divide, but
more on this below.
This very general insight into the mediation challenges linked to the agenda-
setting trajectories of public participation raises the background question of
why mediation is necessary at all. One response, and this is the sixth point, is
to say that any form of social action requires a degree of initiative and
coordination and thus leadership, and that in the case of public participation
processes leadership takes the form of initiating, establishing and maintaining
complex collaborative relationships between multiple partners in state and
society. Perhaps this is obvious, but for many proponents of participatory
democracy the idea of leadership leads to easily back to the elitist justifications
of exclusive representational rule. Consider Burke’s arguments on the ‘trustee’
model of leadership for example. However, acknowledging the importance of
initiative, organising capacity and vision, especially in establishing new
relationships, is also demanded by the research and the lived experience of
politics. Further, while individuals will always matter, arguing that mediation
amounts to a form of leadership is not the same as saying that mediation is
always driven by individuals, mysteriously set apart by some genetic or
developmental X factor. As revealed above, the mediation role is more often
played by organisations that rely on training and socialisation rather than just
individual aptitude, and usually engage in collective forms of decision-making
rather than solely relying on individual ability or charisma. More specifically, the
cases surveyed above illustrate that ‘democratic mediation’ typically occurs as
part of a broader politics of social mobilisation and/or policy engagement that
involves agency by the marginalised group too. In practice then the ‘expert
leadership’ offered by democratic mediators is usually a contribution to a
partnership where other agents have significant power too.
Seventh, the necessity and much of the legitimacy of democratic mediation,
and hence its generic character and typical dynamics, are framed in terms of
the ‘democratic deficits’ typically faced by poor and marginalised communities
across the world. To the extent that democratic mediators posses the
knowledge or resources to assist in overcoming these deficits, they can be
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termed ‘experts’. There are three kinds of such deficit, namely,
representational, knowledge and ideological. Representional deficits refers the
failure of the formal institutions to include certain groups properly; knowledge
deficits to the gaps in information and understand required to secure the rights
of marginalised groups in the system, and ideological deficits to the lack of
commitment by many elites (and citizens) to human rights and democratic
principles.
Eighth, these deficits will exist in different degrees and in combinations across
different cases. In the case of the TAC, the representational deficit refers to the
refusal by the Mbeki-led government to even engage about HIV/AIDS treatment
policy, and the heart of the struggle was to open the policy process so that
those representing people living with HIV and their interests, could impact on
its formulation and implementation. Much technical scientific knowledge was
required to engage in the public and policy debates but also to empower
membership through treatment literacy work. Lastly, the TAC’s politics was
framed in terms of a commitment to health rights as part of human rights,
captured in the South African constitution, and which it criticised government
for failing to respect. In the Via Campesina case, the organisation looks to
access key decision-making forums and processes at international and national
level, build ‘tactical alliances’ with friendly institutions or groups within these
institutions, understand and interpret the technical economic knowledge
propagated by the World Bank, and contest these processes with the language
of democratic rights. They argue that ‘rights holders’ (poor peasants) are
entitled to hold the ‘duty bearers’ (national governments) and now increasingly
international organisations and governance processes accountable for land
policies. In the case of the NRA in Angola, the representational deficits refer to
the failure of political parties to adequately champion the interests of marginal
groups in urban areas, and the poor representation of the interests of these
groups. Hence, using knowledge about the new democratic system and the
internationally available forms of democratic assistance resources the NRA
looks to build the capacity of civil society to represent these interests, invoking
the discourses of democratic responsiveness and citizen rights.
Ninth, this brings us to the question of why these deficits exist, and what it tells
about the character and trajectories of democratisation globally. As noted by
Gaventa (2006: 8–9) the literature on democracy presents a paradox. On the
one hand is the triumphalist view, perhaps most famously stated by Samuel
Huntington, that the we live in the democratic age as the vast majority of
countries of the world have become electoral democracies in the last 30 years.
On the other is the view that the quality of democracy is often poor, with
various forms of deficits emerging across both developed and underdeveloped
parts of the globe. There a substantial number of explanations offered for
dropping levels of political participation in the north, including arguments about
the rise of systems of mass communication and their effects on civic life,
political communication, professional political actors, and the declining role of
parties (for examples see Putnam 2000, Skocpol 2003; and Houtzager and
Lavalle 2010: 6).
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The reasons for the emergence of a deficit regime in the global south centre on
the simultaneous advent of three trends. First is the relatively new introduction
of electoral democracy with its promise of better representation and
responsiveness to the majority, who are poor. Second, is the undermining of
the exclusive grip on power of the newly democratic state due to neoliberal
globalisation, that is, the shifting of some state power upwards to post-national
forms of decision-making and practice, especially around economic issues, and
also sideways to business with the increasing emphasis on market-driven
governance. Third, alongside democratisation and neoliberal globalisation, and
perhaps even linked to it through globally sponsored notions of decen-
tralisation, are new forms of public participation in local governance. Thus at
the same time as democratisation has creating new opportunities for poor and
marginalised groups to pursue their rights, neoliberal globalisation has made
governance more complex, layered, de-centred and, at least in part, responsive
to market logics as much as popular will. In this complex opportunity context
the expert or professional democrat becomes an increasingly important player.
The claim therefore, is that the democratic mediation is both a relatively new
and growing phenomenon that can be explained in terms of this conjunction of
the increasing opportunities for democratic engagement and the growing
complexity and remoteness of governance. There is also no reason to believe
that this tendency will change any time soon – nor is it confined to the south as
the three constitutive elements are also present in many northern contexts too.
We live, on the one hand, in the era where the idea of democracy is
hegemonic and yet the promise of a better life for the global poor and
marginalised appears no closer to fulfilment. Hence the demand for democratic
responsiveness is only likely to grow. At the same time the tendency to supply
increasingly post-national forms of governance to facilitate the better economic
integration of the globe means that decision-making will continue to be pulled
upwards, albeit substantially constrained by national interest and hence it will
endure as complex.
In sum, there is good reason to believe that the context conducive to
democratic mediation will endure, and perhaps even grow. Our argument is not
that we are entering the age of the expert democrat, but rather than democratic
mediation will continue to be an important, and even growing, form of
democratic politics. Further, given the legitimacy weaknesses of democratic
mediation we are unlikely to see it manifest in pure form, so much as part of a
larger politics which includes more traditional representatives of the
marginalised in a coalition or alliance, and which draws on forms of politics
practiced by members of the marginalised group too. Hence, the expert
democrat will rarely work on their own for the people, but more commonly as a
strategic partner in a team which includes representatives of the people and is
supported with a politics practiced by the people.
Tenth, this brings us to further implications of the practice of democratic
mediation for theoretical reflection on some favourite binaries, namely
representation and participation, and invented and invited spaces. By now the
notion that representation and participation must exist in some kind of
opposition should have been dismissed. The paper has shown how in many
IDS WORKING PAPER 364
38
cases democratic mediation has the objective of enhancing the representation
of marginalised groups in decision-making, including participatory decision-
making processes. As David Plotke puts it, ‘the opposite of representation is
not participation, the opposite of representation is exclusion’. Similarly, drawing
attention to the role of the mediator in participatory engagements, confuses the
simple dichotomy between ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ spaces as the mediator may
come from either side of the equation or neither – indeed the mediator may be
a member of the state in some cases of ‘invention’ or a member of civil society
in some cases of ‘invitation’. Further, participatory spaces may involve alliances
of actors across the state-society divide advocating for greater inclusion for
marginalised groups. Further, and as noted by Cornwall and Coelho (2007)
even if a space begins as a formal ‘invited space’ of the state, over time
engagement by citizens may transform the space into something it was not
originally intended to be originally. The analysis of democratic mediation affirms
this push beyond these powerful but limited binaries, opening up the theorising
of democratic engagement in new ways. In short, democratic mediation shifts
the focus of enquiry from who initiates participation to how participation occurs
and the resources and capacities required to initiate and sustain it.
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